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ESPITE ITS STRONG COMMITMENT to civil liberties, the
United States government is conspicuously reluctant to re c-
o g n i ze economic and social rights (ESR) within its ow n
b o rders. This article explores legal avenues available to pur-
sue ESR claims in the absence of explicit Constitutional guarantees. T h e
purpose is twofold: first, by framing U.S. cases in the context of interna-
tional law, the article highlights opportunities to bring domestic jurispru-
dence in line with well-established human rights standards. Second, the
U.S. domestic experience can be instru c t i ve for advocates in other coun-
tries who are struggling to ove rcome similar obstacles to the re c o g n i t i o n
of ESR.
The framew o rk of legal obligations under international human
rights instruments provides a useful device for organizing domestic ESR
strategies. Under international law, governments are obliged to re s p e c t ,
p ro t e c t and f u l f i l l the human rights of those within their borders. T h i s
means that the government must refrain from encroaching upon people's
existing rights (respect); it must protect people from violations by third
p a rties (protect); and finally it must establish political, economic and
social systems that provide eve ryone access to the guaranteed right (ful-
fill). Running through these three levels of obligations are the ove r a rc h-
ing human rights principles of n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and p ro g re s s i ve re a l i z a -
t i o n . The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cu l t u r a l
Rights (ICESCR) prohibits discrimination in access to ESR on the
g rounds of “race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, pro p e rt y, birth or other status.” Pro g re s s i ve re a l-
ization obliges a government to fulfill ESR “to the maximum of ava i l a b l e
re s o u rc e s”. This means that they must not pursue policies that either
d e p r i ve people of the most basic element of each right (“the minimum
c o re content”), or actually decrease people's access to a right (“the princi-
ple of non-re t ro g re s s i o n”). In the following sections, the article examines
U.S. caselaw through the lens of these obligations. 
T h e re are numerous avenues available to pursue ESR under domes-
tic law - this article focuses on three. First, nearly eve ry state constitution
guarantees an adequate education, and a few state courts have re c o g n i ze d
other rights implied by general we l f a re provisions. Second, advocates can
anchor their claims on Equal Protection guarantees, as well as federal,
state and local anti-discrimination laws. Fi n a l l y, the Due Process Clause
of the Fo u rteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution can be used to
p re vent rollbacks in social benefits.
DEFENDING ESR UNDER THE RUBRIC
OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS IN THE U.S. can be used to addre s s
both access to and adequacy of ESR. These laws include the equal pro-
tection clauses of federal and state constitutions, and federal, state and
local statutes. The rights to education, work, and shelter have been liti-
gated extensively through anti-discrimination actions. 
The Fifth and Fo u rteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
limit the power of the government to discriminate against members of
c e rtain groups. The Fo u rteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
p rovides that: “No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.” The Su p reme Court has interpre t-
ed this protection to apply to the federal government as well, through the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
In interpreting equal protection, howe ve r, the Su p reme Court does
not consider differential treatment is not discriminatory per se. Rather, to
establish discrimination where a law is neutral on its face, a victim must
p rove both impact and purpose. That is, the law must have a dispro p o r-
tionate or disparate effect on the group to which the victim belongs, and
the state must have enacted the law with such effect intentionally in
mind. This is one point of depart u re from international law, which pro-
hibits treatment that has e i t h e r d i s c r i m i n a t o ry purpose or e f f e c t .
The Court has fashioned a series of tests to determine the constitu-
tionality of laws that explicitly distinguish between various protected cat-
egories of individuals. Depending on the classification invo l ved, the
C o u rt re v i ews state action according to one of three standards of judicial
s c ru t i n y. If a law or practice discriminates on the basis of race, citize n s h i p
or national origin, or if it burdens the exe rcise of a “f u n d a m e n t a l” right,
a “strict scru t i n y” standard applies. The state must demonstrate that the
challenged classification is justified by a compelling government intere s t
and is “n a r rowly tailore d” to further that interest. If the law or practice
explicitly discriminates on the basis of gender or legitimacy, the Court
applies an “intermediate” standard of re v i ew, where a classification must
s e rve “important governmental objective s” and must be “s u b s t a n t i a l l y
re l a t e d” to the achievement of those objectives. Fi n a l l y, other “n o n - s u s-
p e c t” classifications are generally upheld as long as the State demonstrates
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a “rational basis” for making its distinction. In areas of social and eco-
nomic policy, “a statutory classification that neither proceeds along sus-
pect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceiva b l e
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”
W h e reas U.S. courts re q u i re more than a “rational basis” to justify
explicit distinctions only on the basis of race, citize n s h i p, national origin,
gender and legitimacy, Article 2 of the ICESCR bans discrimination “o f
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, pro p e rt y, birth or other status” (emphasis
added). This definition prohibits any distinction that impairs a person's
e xe rcise of his or her rights. The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) has found discrimination in va r i o u s
domestic laws that make distinctions on the basis of age, health status
and disability.
Because the people most affected by social and economic rights vio-
lations frequently do belong to a “suspect category” under the equal pro-
tection clause, constitutional claims are commonly invoked to enforc e
social and economic rights such as the right to education and shelter. In
Brown vs. the Board of Ed u c a t i o n , for example, the Su p reme Court re l i e d
on the Equal Protection Clause to hold that a racially segregated public
school system was unconstitutional. . Even if the quality of tangible fac-
tors like curriculum, teachers and facilities was comparable in all-black
and all-white schools, the Court found that racial separation generated a
sense of inferiority that inevitably impaired their ability to learn: “[t]o
separated them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
e ver to be undone.” 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
ESR advocates can also refer to anti-discrimination measures in
federal, state and local statutes. The Fo u rteenth Amendment prov i d e s
C o n g ress with the power to pass any laws necessary for its enforc e m e n t .
Because the Amendment was originally interpreted to cover only gove r n-
ment action, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to re a c h
i n d i v i d u a l s who discriminate against others on the basis of race, color,
religion or national origin. This extension coincides with the ESCR
Committee's interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination to
c over acts by both public authorities and by private individuals. It is also
consistent with states' obligation to pre vent third parties from encro a c h-
ing on individual rights. Titles VI and VII of the Act specifically pro h i b-
it discrimination in federally funded programs (Title VI) and in the
w o rkplace if the employer is engaged in interstate commerce (Title VII). 
In certain situations, federal, state and local anti-discrimination
statutes provide protection to groups outside the traditional suspect class-
es. The Fair Housing Act, for example, prohibits discrimination based on
race, religion, national origin, sex, familial status or disability. Some state
laws prohibit discrimination based on grounds linked to pove rt y. In New
Je r s e y, the legislature enacted a statute that prohibits landowners fro m
refusing to rent or lease a house or apartment based on the pro s p e c t i ve
tenant's source of lawful income. 
FULFILLMENT OF ESR AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
TO THE EXTENT THAT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS IN THE U.S. a re re c-
o g n i zed, they are found mainly in state constitutions. The most far-
reaching ESR jurisprudence arises from courts considering the right to
education, which all state constitutions guarantee. The framing and judi-
cial interpretation of the right to education has undergone changes ove r
the years. Be t ween 1971 and 1973, advocates used the federal Eq u a l
Protection Clause to argue that education was a “fundamental right” and
that policies which resulted in per-pupil spending disparities infringed
upon that right. Courts applied strict scrutiny analysis to examine those
policies. In 1973, howe ve r, the Su p reme Court ended its strict scru t i n y
a p p roach cases with its decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Ro d r i g u e z , which held that wealth is not a suspect classification
for the purpose of equal protection re v i ew, and that education is not a
fundamental right. Be t ween 1973 and 1979, advocates attacked unfair
school finance systems with the equal protection and education clauses
in state constitutions. This strategy had mixed success because it was dif-
ficult to distinguish spending from other variables that impact education-
al opport u n i t y. Ad vocates finally abandoned reliance on equal pro t e c t i o n
arguments in favor of an approach focusing on the adequacy of education.
T h ree cases in particular illustrate how the right to education has
been defined over the past decade in state courts: Edgewood In d e p e n d e n t
School District v. Kirby (Edgewood), Rose v. Council for Better Ed u c a t i o n
( Ro s e ) , and Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New Yo rk (CFE). The Ed g ew o o d
case, decided in 1989, was one of the first cases to use an “a d e q u a c y”
rather than “e q u i t y” argument to challenge school finance systems. T h e
Texas Su p reme Court found that the state's pro p e rty tax-based system for
financing public education violated the state constitution. Article V I I ,
Section 1 of the Texas constitution declares that “a general diffusion of
k n ow l e d g e” is “essential to the pre s e rvation of the liberties and rights of
the people”. To that end, the section states that “it shall be the duty of the
L e g i s l a t u re of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the
s u p p o rt and maintenance of an efficient system of free schools.”
The court held that “e f f i c i e n t” conveys the meaning of effective or
“p ro d u c t i ve of re s u l t s” as well as the economical use of re s o u rces. It found
that “[t]he present system provides not for a diffusion that is general, but
for one that is limited and unbalanced. The resultant inequalities are thus
d i rectly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency.” In part i c u l a r,
the court noted that while efficiency does not re q u i re a per capita distri-
bution, there must be direct and close correlation between a district's tax
e f f o rt and the education re s o u rces available to it. T h roughout Texas, the
tax burden and money raised varied dramatically, with the we a l t h i e s t
a reas enjoying both dispro p o rtionately low taxes and we l l - re s o u rc e d
schools. Rather than ordering a specific remedy or requiring the legisla-
t u re to raise taxes, the court set a time limit for the legislature to deve l o p
a new financing system.
Also in 1989, the Su p reme Court of Kentucky had the opport u n i-
ty to examine its own constitutional mandate to provide an “efficient sys-
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tem of common schools throughout the state”. In Ro s e , the court we n t
into much more explicit detail about what efficiency re q u i res. It found
that an efficient system of education must aim to endow each child with
s e ven specific capacities; including knowledge of economic, social and
political systems, strong communications skills, and sufficient training in
academic or vocational fields to choose and pursue his or her life work
i n t e l l i g e n t l y.
Like its Texas counterpart, the Kentucky court did not re q u i re the
state legislature to enact any specific legislation, such as raising taxes. It s
i n s t ructions we re neve rtheless quite onerous to the General Assembly,
which had to “re c reate and re-establish a system of common schools” .
The Assembly quickly passed the Kentucky Education Reform Act of
1990, which resulted in tax legislation that increased re venues by more
than one billion dollars. Re venues for all school districts increased by at
least eight percent and, in some districts, up to twe n t y - f i ve percent. To
some observers, the Rose decision “constitutes one of the most compre-
h e n s i ve interventions by a state judiciary into the realm of legislative pol-
icymaking for education.”
In the decade since Ro s e , Kentucky schools have steadily improve d .
For the first time, Kentucky students in all three grades tested in 2001
matched or exceeded the national average on a basic skills assessment.
The re l a t i ve success of school reform in Ke n t u c k y, as opposed to other
states, is due in large part to effective citizen advocacy groups that not
only laid the gro u n d w o rk for reform but also monitored implementation
in the succeeding ye a r s .
O ver a decade after the first adequacy decisions came down in
Texas, Kentucky and other states, education reform advocates won a
major victory in New Yo rk. In C F E, New Yo rk's Court of Appeals held
that Article 11 of the state constitution entitled all students an “o p p o rt u-
nity for a m e a n i n gful high school education, one which pre p a res them to
function pro d u c t i vely as civic part i c i p a n t s” (emphasis added). This ru l-
ing elaborates on the Court's previous determination that Article 11
re q u i res a “sound basic education”. It also reinstates most of the trial
c o u rt's decision holding that the current system of school funding is
unconstitutional. 
During the seven-month trial, Justice De Grasse of the trial court
e valuated the adequacy of New Yo rk City public school education by
examining both the re s o u rces available, or “inputs”, and measures of stu-
dent achievement, or “o u t p u t s”. Among inputs, the court considere d
whether students benefited from minimally adequate teaching of re a-
sonably up-to-date basic curricula. It looked at evidence of teacher cer-
tification, professional development opportunities, and salaries. It also
noted that the schools had poor physical facilities, we re ove rc rowd e d ,
and suffered a chronic shortage of books. Among outputs, the court
e valuated evidence of graduation and dropout rates, and student per-
formance on standard i zed tests. The schools performed poorly in both
categories. To establish a causal link between the current funding system
and the poor condition of city schools, the court questioned whether
i n c reased funding could provide New Yo rk City with better teachers,
better school buildings and better technology. Although the re q u i re-
ments of a right to education cannot be gauged by funds alone, the
c o u rt found as a matter of fact that additional financial re s o u rces we re
re q u i red to address the crisis.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's analysis and gave
the State approximately one year to reform its public school system by
achieving the following objectives: ascertaining the costs of reforming the
public school system, providing public schools with necessary re s o u rc e s ,
and establishing a system of accountability to ensure the effective use of
these re s o u rces, particularly financial re s o u rc e s .
In the area of education, these cases demonstrate courts' willingness
to develop detailed tools to assess a state's compliance with its constitu-
tional mandates. The standards they prescribe exceed the “c o re mini-
m u m” content re q u i red under international law. Articles 13 and 14 of
the ICESCR stipulate that primary education shall be compulsory and
a vailable free to all. Se c o n d a ry education “shall be made generally ava i l-
able and accessible to all by eve ry appropriate means.” In addition, the
“material condition of teaching staff” must also continuously improve .
The Rose and CFE decisions demand even more by enumerating specif-
ic skills students need to pursue economically pro d u c t i ve and politically
engaged lives. 
OTHER ESR RIGHTS: SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND SHELTER
While many courts have re c o g n i zed a robust right to education
arising from state constitutional language, other social and economic
rights have re c e i ved far less extensive attention. Howe ve r, there are a few
outstanding examples that demonstrate the promise of a state constitu-
tional approach, especially with respect to we l f a re assistance and housing.
In Tucker v. To i a, the New Yo rk Court of Appeals made a broad interpre-
tation of Article XVII of the New Yo rk Constitution: “the aid, care and
s u p p o rt of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the
state and by such of its subdivisions . . . as the legislature may . . . deter-
mine.” It found that the language imposed “a positive duty upon the
s t a t e” to provide we l f a re payments to anyone considered indigent under
the state's need standard even if they could not present papers prov i n g
that they re c e i ved no support from re l a t i ves. 
Another we l l - k n own New Yo rk case, Callahan v. Ca re y, relied on
A rticle XVII of the state constitution to challenge the city's inadequate
emergency shelter system. In this case, the National Coalition for the
Homeless filed a class-action suit on behalf of homeless men in
Manhattan, relying on various provisions of the New Yo rk Constitution
and other state and municipal laws to demand that the city to prov i d e
shelter to any man who requested it. The brief cited legislative history
f rom the 1938 New Yo rk constitutional convention to argue that the lan-
guage in Article XVII was intended to confer rights to those “who must
look to society for the bare necessities of life” .
After difficult negotiations, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a
consent decree requiring New Yo rk City to furnish sufficient beds for
e ve ry homeless man applying for shelter determined to meet cert a i n
needs criteria. The consent decree mandated, among other things, a min-
imum of three feet between beds, and one toilet for eve ry six re s i d e n t s .
These standards demonstrate courts' capacity to fashion re m e d i e s
a d d ressing complicated social issues. Other courts have re c o g n i zed a right
to shelter based on “general we l f a re” provisions of their state constitutions
as well as state and local statutes. In 1975, the New Jersey Su p reme Court
held that a zoning ordinance in Mount Laurel township violated the con-
stitutional re q u i rement that the state's police power promote “p u b l i c
health, safety, morals or the general we l f a re”. Because the land use con-
t rols excluded low- and moderate-income families from the municipali-
t y, they we re deemed invalid. The court stated that “[t]here cannot be the
slightest doubt that shelter, along with food, are the most basic human
n e e d s”, and that it was beyond dispute that adequate housing is “ an
absolute essential in promotion of the general we l f a re re q u i red in all local
land use regulations.” The court imposed an obligation on eve ry deve l-
oping municipality to provide a realistic opportunity for “decent and ade-
quate low and moderate income housing”. Un f o rt u n a t e l y, the court
failed to provide any guidance about how to fulfill this mandate. In s t e a d ,
it granted the township 90 days to reform its land use regulations. Fo r
nearly ten years Mount Laurel and the other municipalities affected did
v i rtually nothing to comply with the judgment. 
In 1983 six cases stemming from the above decisions we re consoli-
2
Economic and Social Rights 
dated in the New Jersey Su p reme Court as “ Mount Laurel II”. In his
opinion, Chief Justice Wiletz declared that without more forceful judi-
cial intervention, “Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper,
p rocess, witnesses, trials and appeals.” It was time, he wrote, to “put some
steel into the doctrine”. Providing a “realistic opport u n i t y” for the pro-
duction of low and moderate income housing meant more than elimi-
nating exc l u s i o n a ry zoning regulations. Each municipality was obliged to
p rove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “a likelihood - to the extent
economic conditions allow- that the lower income housing will actually
be constructed.” Faced with heavy pre s s u re to respond to this ruling, in
1995 the New Jersey legislature passed the Fair Housing Act. This Ac t
codified the doctrine elaborated in the first Mount Laurel case and cre a t-
ed a Council on Affordable Housing to monitor compliance with the
d e c rees. As a result of the Mount Laurel decisions, between 1987 and
1992 the state constructed or rehabilitated approximately 54,000 low -
and moderate-income housing units. 
While the Ca l l a h a n and Mount Laure l cases demonstrate the possi-
bility of claiming a right to shelter in U.S. courts, they fall far short of
recognizing a right to adequate housing as defined under international
l a w. General Comment No. 4, adopted by the ESCR Committee, elab-
orates seven criteria of housing adequacy. These include: security of
t e n u re; availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastru c t u re ;
a f f o rdability; habitability; accessibility; location (access to employ m e n t ,
health care, schools, etc.); and cultural adequacy. Although a gove r n m e n t
does not need to provide free housing to eve ryone, it has an obligation to
p r i o r i t i ze its policies to benefit the most vulnerable and disadva n t a g e d .
While the Ca l l a h a n targets such a group - the homeless- it does not
a d d ress whether the remedies provided are adequate to meet its needs.
Some aspects of adequacy, like security of tenure and accessibility, are
c ove red separately by federal, state and local statutes. 
NON-REGRESSION OF ESR AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
THE EDUCATION, WELFARE AND SHELTER CASES described are re p-
re s e n t a t i ve of courts' attempts to elaborate the substance of state consti-
tutional rights. “Pro g re s s i ve re a l i z a t i o n”, as noted above, re q u i res a gov-
ernment to fulfill ESR to the maximum of available re s o u rces. The prin-
ciple of “n o n - re t ro g re s s i o n”, in contrast, provides that there can be no
degradation of rights already re a l i zed. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment is one tool for resisting encroachment upon existing
ESR. It demands that the government provide protections like notice and
a hearing when it attempts to deprive a person of her “life, libert y, or
p ro p e rt y”. In the Su p reme Court decision Goldberg v. Ke l l y, the scope of
“p ro p e rt y” interests cove red under the clause was expanded to include
we l f a re payments. The Court explained that since a government benefit
p rovides an eligible recipient with “the ve ry means by which to live,” the
g overnment may not impair that recipient's interest arbitrarily. The same
analysis was applied in the Washington D.C. shelter case Williams v.
Ba r ry. T h e re, the court held that the city must afford procedural pro t e c-
tions before cutting off funds to support shelters for homeless males.
Although no right to shelter exists independently in the jurisdiction, the
city had “c h a rted a course of deliberate, consistent action that solidified
and expanded the homeless person program.” Its beneficiaries could
t h e re f o re claim a legal interest in continued use of those serv i c e s .
CONCLUSION
DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT to restrict the re c o g-
nition of ESR, advocates have advanced successful claims using a range
of tools, from non-discrimination statutes to specific constitutional lan-
guage. The decisions described above demonstrate that ESR are justicia-
ble. They affirm a court's capacity to assess the availability of re s o u rc e s ,
to balance competing demands on those re s o u rces, and to monitor the
adequacy of complex social policies. Howe ve r, they also re veal areas that
fall short of human rights standards. As ESR practitioners re c o g n i ze, cre-
a t i ve strategies and solutions drawn from different domestic contexts are
re q u i red to better re d ress such discre p a n c i e s .
Jessica Schultz is the Protection Advisor for Oxfam GB in the Mano River Region in
West Africa.
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A woman rests during a protest for adequate housing in the United St a t e s .
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